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Résumé:
Un panel de 186 banques européennes sur la période 1992-2004 est utilisé pour déterminer si les uctua-
tions de lo¤re de crédit des banques sont ampliées par la contrainte réglementaire sur les fonds propres et
par les règles de provisionnement. Nos résultats sont en accord avec lhypothèse du canal du capital bancaire :
les banques faiblement capitalisées se trouvent contraintes pour accroître leur o¤re de crédit. Nous montrons
également que les provisions contractées pour couvrir des pertes identiées (provisions non discrétionnaires)
amplient les uctuations de lo¤re de crédits. En e¤et, ces provisions non discrétionnaires évoluent de façon
cyclique et conduisent à une mauvaise prise en compte des pertes anticipées. Lincitation de la banque à o¤rir
du crédit est donc a¤ectée dans la mesure où les coûts liés à laccord dun crédit sont mal évalués. Dautre
part, la proportion des provisions utilisée pour des objectifs de management (provisions discrétioanaires)
na¤ecte pas les uctuations de lo¤re de crédit. Les résultats de cet article conduisent à recommander la
mise en place dun système de provisionnement dynamique en Europe.
Classication JEL: G21
Mots-clés: crédit, provisions, capital réglementaire
Abstract:
A panel of 186 European banks is used for the period 1992-2004 to determine if banking behaviors,
induced by the capital adequacy constraint and the provisioning system, amplify credit uctuations. Our
nding is consistent with the bank capital channel hypothesis, which means that poorly capitalized banks
are constrained to expand credit. We also nd that loan loss provisions (LLP) made in order to cover
identied credit losses (non discretionary LLP) amplify credit uctuations. Indeed, non discretionary LLP
evolve cyclically. This leads to a misevaluation of expected credit risk which a¤ect banksincentives to grant
new loans since lending costs are misstated. By contrast, LLP use for management objectives (discretionary
LLP) do not a¤ect credit uctuations. The ndings of our research are consistent with the call for the
implementation of dynamic provisioning in Europe.
JEL classication: G21
Keywords: bank lending, loan loss provisions, capital requirement
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1 Introduction
Much concern has been recently expressed about factors explaining uctuations in bank lending. Central
banks, as well as banking regulators, are concerned since such factors could exacerbate the business cycle,
cause nancial instability and misallocate lending resources. The literature on uctuations in bank lending
is based on the work of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) who introduced the credit market equilibrium in a
textbook IS-LM model and analyzed the interaction between monetary policy and bank lending. A better
understanding of the economys response to a monetary policy shock requires therefore to consider a bank
lending channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) which emphasizes the role of imperfections in the market for
bank debt. This hypothesis is empirically supported by Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) for American banks
and by Ehrmann et al. (2003) for European banks. Imperfections in the market for bank capital can also be
stressed to explain uctuations in bank lending. Van den Heuvel (2002) focuses on capital requirements and
denes a bank capital channel by which monetary policy can change the supply of bank loans through its
impact on bank equity. These two channels do not only operate through changes in monetary policy. They
are also relevant in explaining the impact of macroeconomic conditions and changes in banking regulation
on bank lending.
In this paper, we point out another factor which may amplify the cyclicality of bank lending: the pro-
visioning system. Provisioning rules and the capital requirement are linked through the coverage of credit
risk: the conceptual framework of credit risk management supposes that expected losses have to be covered
by loan loss provisions while unexpected losses have to be covered by bank capital. While regulatory con-
straint explicitly links the expansion of bank lending with bank capital, such a constraint does not exist on
provisioning rules. However, loan loss provisions have a direct impact on banks prot. An underestimated
expected credit risk could reinforce banksincentives to grant new loans since lending costs are understated.
In addition, increases in loan loss provisions due to deterioration in loan portfolio quality can lead to a de-
crease in banks capital if losses are too strong. Credit risk management without provisioning rules covering
expected credit risk may therefore have procyclical e¤ects. This concern is all the more important as banking
regulators and academic researchers focus mainly on capital requirements and tend to disregard provisioning
practices. Hence, in this paper we analyze if the management of loan loss provisions may explain changes in
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bankslending behavior over the business cycle.
The relationship between loan loss provisions and credit supply uctuations has to be cautiously analyzed
because loan loss provisions merge di¤erent information and behaviors. The literature distinguishes two
components1 . The rst one, called the non discretionary component, is made in order to cover expected
credit losses in a banks loan portfolio (Whalen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996). This kind of provisioning
system is said to be backward-looking since banks mainly relate non discretionary provisions to identied
credit losses. During economic upswings, few credit losses are identied and the level of loan loss provisions is
low. During downturns, however, loan loss provisions increase because loan defaults are usually high during
this period. As a result, the non discretionary component is a driving force in the cyclicality of loan loss
provisions and leads to a misevaluation of expected credit losses. The expected credit risk appears as soon
as the loan is granted and not only during the downturn when the losses is nally identied. In particular,
Keeton (1999) and Jiménez and Saurina (2005) show that an increase in loan growth during an expansionary
phase leads to higher loan losses during the slowdown. Expected credit losses are therefore under-provisioned
during an upswing phase. Conversely, banks have to charge provisions too late during the downturn. The
cyclicality of loan loss provisions directly a¤ect bank prots and bank capital which could inuence the banks
incentive to grant new loans and increase the cyclicality of its lending.
The second component, called the discretionary component, is due to the utilization of loan loss provisions
for management objectives. At least three di¤erent discretionary actions can be distinguished (Liu et al.,
1997; Ahmed et al., 1999; Lobo and Yang, 2001). The rst one, the income smoothing behavior, may be
countercyclical. Banks have incentives to smooth earnings over time. When earnings are expected to be
low, loan loss provisions are deliberately understated to mitigate adverse e¤ects of other factors on earnings.
On the other hand, when earnings are unusually high, banks choose discretionary income-reducing accruals.
Thus, under the income-smoothing behavior, banks choose accruals to minimize the variance of reported
earnings. This implies that loan loss provisions increase during an expansionary phase and decrease during a
recession phase. Consequently, the income smoothing behavior may have a positive impact on bank lending.
1Accounting practices distinguish specic provisions and general provisions (Cortavaria et al., 2000). Specic provisions are
dened by specic accounting rules. They depend on identied credit losses and they will increase specic loan loss reserves
which are deducted from assets. General provisions have to cope with expected losses and will be added to general loan loss
reserves on liabilities, but banks do not implement rigorous and statistical methods to compute them. Consequently, general
provisions depend partially on expansion of total loans and they are manipulated by discretionary behaviors of bank managers.
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The two other discretionary actions are concerned with capital management and signalling. With regard to
capital management, capital-constrained banks can use discretionary accruals to achieve regulatory-capital
targets. General and specic provisions reduce Tier 1 capital via their e¤ect on earnings. But since general
provisions are also included as components of Tier 2 capital and deduced from risk-weighted assets2 , an
increase in general provisions may actually increase the regulatory capital, especially if the increase in Tier
2 is larger than the decrease in Tier 1 capital. To the extent that such discretionary behavior increases
regulatory capital without a corresponding reduction in risk of insolvency, it constitutes regulatory capital
arbitrage. The last discretionary behavior occurs when banks use loan loss provisions to signal nancial
strength. The opportunity for signaling through discretionary loan loss provisions arises when managers
have information indicating that bank values are higher than those assessed by the market. Such banks may
be willing to see their market values revised upwards. One may view this is a signal that the bank is strong
enough to absorb future potential losses by increasing current loan loss provisions.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the e¤ect of the provisioning system on uctuations in bank
lending in Europe. In particular, we attempt to determine if loan loss provisions amplify the credit cycle.
Using a panel of European banks for the period 1992-2004, we estimate the non discretionary and discretionary
components of loan loss provisions in order to isolate individually their impact on banks lending. The concern
about the impact of loan loss provisions on credit cycle is particularly relevant for the debate between
nancial supervisors and accounting authorities about the reform in bank provisioning systems. The current
provisioning system in Europe is backward-looking (excluding Spain and Portugal since recent years) and
a such system may amplify the cyclicality of bank lending. In recent years, there have been calls (Trichet,
2000; Poveda, 2000; Crockett, 2000 and Borio et al., 2001) for more forward-looking provisioning decisions to
mitigate the potential problem that may arise from the cyclicality of lending and bank protability. But there
is no consensus about the way in which this should be achieved: dynamic provisioning3 promotes banking
2General provisions can increase loan loss reserves of up to 1.25% of risk weighted assets, the excess will be deducted from
Tier1.
3With a statistical or dynamic provisioning system, general and specic provisions are created continuously in the traditional
manner. General provisions are established as usual to cover expected losses as a given proportion of the total loan portfolio,
which are, however, not connected with direct assets and are for unspecied losses. Specic provisions are created to cover the
expected impairment of assets based on problem loans. In addition to these provisions, the statistical provision is formed with
purpose of anticipating risks arising from changes in business cycles for each risk category. The statistical provision records the
expected losses connected with the initial portfolio in a way that total provisions (specic, general and statistical) created over
the years are smoothed. The statistical provision increases in periods of economic growth, complementing net specic provisions,
which are rather low in these periods compared to total loans. Such a system was established in Spain, Portugal and Australia.
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stability whereas Full Fair Value Accounting4 (FFVA) promotes market discipline.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on bank behavior
and procyclicality. Section 3 reports the empirical methodology employed to di¤erentiate the discretionary
and non discretionary components of loan loss provisions. Section 4 presents estimates of the impact of
provisioning practices on credit uctuations. Section 5 discusses the credit cycle and dynamic provisioning
practices. Concluding remarks are presented in the nal section.
2 Related literature on bank behavior and procyclicality
The literature which analyzes uctuations in bank lending behavior provides some empirical evidence of
cyclicality. Asea and Blomberg (1998), using US data from 1977 to 1993, show that bank lending evolves
cyclically, a¤ecting aggregate economic activity. In addition, Peek et al. (2003) and Lown and Morgan (2006)
clearly identify the e¤ects of loan supply on uctuations in credit and GDP which supports the existence of
the bank lending channel.
These interactions between the credit cycle and the business cycle are underlined on Figure 1 for Germany,
France, Italy and United Kingdom over the period 1980-20045 . As Figure 1 shows, the growth of bank lending
in these four European countries is characterized by signicant short term uctuations. These uctuations
are stronger than the ones of the business cycles. Means on absolute values and standard errors (Table 1)
sum up this di¤erence in size exhibited in Figure 1. Nevertheless, the credit and business cycles have a strong
and similar persistence since their rst order autocorrelations are around 0.90 (Table 1). Moreover, there is
signicant interdependence between the credit and business cycles. Granger causality tests (Table 1) show
that there is a feedback e¤ect between credit and GDP although this e¤ect appears weaker in Germany.
Contemporaneous correlations are also signicantly positive except for Italy (Table 1). Fluctuations in bank
For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see Fernandez de Lis et al. (2001), Borio et al. (2001) and Mann and Michael
(2002).
4Full fair value accounting tries to approximate as closely as possible the value that the asset would have if it were traded on
the market. This implies that the value of a banks problem assets will fall immediately, in contrast with historical accounting
where banks have to make reserves for the di¤erence between the book value and the actual value. One of the benets of fair
value accounting is that it o¤ers better information to investors and supervisors. However, the frequent changes in the value of
assets exposed to market price uctuations tend to amplify capital volatility and thus lending cycles. See Jackson and Lodge
(2000) and the Joint Working Group Standard Setters (2000) for an overview of the debate on fair value accounting.
5The gures for all the European country are not reported to economize on space. We nd that the growth of bank lending
is cyclical for all them.
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credit thus may have signicant, indeed critical, e¤ects on the macroeconomic activity and may amplify
swings in the economy.
Bikker (2004), for a panel of 26 OECD countries over the period 1979-1999, nds that lending at a
macroeconomic level is strongly dependent on demand factors, measured by cyclical variables such as real
GDP growth, ination, unemployment and real money supply. However, such macroeconomic approach
understates the role played by bank characteristics. This is because of the identication problem; it is di¢ cult
to separate the role of loan demand from that of loan supply. This di¢ culty has prompted researchers to focus
on microeconomic panel data to explore some of the cross-sectional implications of the bank lending view.
Much concern focused on the impact of monetary policy. The responses of banks to changes in monetary
policy may di¤er, depending on their characteristics. The idea behind this is that some types of banks are
more capable than others to o¤set a monetary policy shock. Indeed, changes in the money market rate a¤ect
the cost of funding but this has a limited e¤ect on lending when banks can easily raise non-deposit funding
or when banks own a bu¤er of liquid assets. Kashyap and Stein (1995) originally proposed a reduced form
dynamic equation for bank loans using a panel of American banks over the period 1976-1992. Their ndings
are consistent with the bank lending channel view and show that loan growth of large banks and small banks
respond di¤erently to a monetary policy shock. Other studies on American banks, following the approach of
Kashyap and Stein (1995), nd that the impact of the bank lending channel is also greater for banks with
less liquid assets and less capital (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000). The bank lending
view is relevant for European banks as well (Altunbas et al., 2002; Ehrmann et al 2003) even if studies on
the role of banks capital display mixed results. Individual country estimates can give more conclusive results
(see Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) and Gambacorta (2005) for the Italian case).
The studies mentioned above point out a bank lending channel based on imperfections in the market
for bank debt. Imperfections in the market for bank equity are also stressed to explain the impact of bank
capital on lending and then to dene a bank capital channel (Van den Heuvel, 2002). The bank capital
channel assumes a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. An increase in the money market rate
are therefore supposed to a¤ect more strongly interest rates on banks liabilities than interest rates on banks
assets. Consequently, the increase in the money market rate implies a reduction in a bank prot and therefore
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in the banks capital. Since issuing equity is costly and banks have to meet capital requirements, a monetary
policy shock can a¤ect bank lending. Van den Heuvel (2002) shows that the bank capital channel concerns all
low-capitalized banks and not only banks with capital binding constraint. Theoretical investigations (Chami
and Cosimano, 2001; Zicchino, 2005; Furne, 2001) also emphasized the role of macroeconomic conditions
and changes in banking regulation to explain the impact of capital requirement on bank lending.
The bank capital channel is consistent with empirical ndings related to the 1990-1992 "credit crunch"
in the United States. These studies focus directly on the impact of capital requirement on bank lending
and try to assess whether there was a "capital crunch" caused by increased capital requirements or if more
stringent regulatory practices occurred at the beginning of the 1990s6 . Bernanke and Lown (1991) nd a
positive correlation between loan growth and changes in bank capital during 1990-1991 while Hancock and
Wilcox (1998) and Peek and Rosengren (1995) detect a positive e¤ect of bank capital requirement on credit
growth during the same period. Brinkmann and Horwitz (1995) also nd a positive e¤ect on loan growth,
but only for large banks. Wagster (1999) shows that stricter supervision, which occurred during the period
1990-92 in Canada, UK and the USA, implies that less credits were extended to lower-risk investments such
as government bonds.
Misevaluation of credit risk over the business cycle represents another feature which may explain uctu-
ations in bank lending. In phases of economic boom, banks are inclined to take on greater risks, owing to
their basically positive anticipations as regards the course of the economy and future trends. By contrast,
banks are excessively pessimistic during cyclical downturns if they overstate credit risk. Disaster myopia
(Guttentag and Herring, 1984, 1986), herd behavior (Rajan, 1994) and the institutional memory hypothesis
(Berger and Udell, 2003) account for misevaluation of credit risk. Disaster myopia emphasizes that banks
tend over time to underestimate the probability of low-frequency shocks while herd behavior focuses on the
idea that banks management is obsessed with short-term concerns and perception of reputation. As for the
institutional memory hypothesis, it stresses that current loan o¢ cers ease credit standards over time as the
previous loan bust is not remembered because of loan o¢ cer turnover.
Backward-looking provisioning systems also contribute to the misevaluation of credit risk. Whalen (1994)
6The BIS risk-based capital standards began to phase in at the end of 1990 and were fully implemented in 1992.
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and Beaver and Engle (1996) identify a non discretionary component in loan loss provisions related to
contemporaneous problem loans. Besides, Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005)
show that provisioning behavior is related to the business cycle. These studies therefore highlight that
the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans exhibit a strong cyclicality. This is notably documented for
France (Clerc et al., 2001), Austria (Arpa et al., 2001), Spain (Fernandez de Lis et al., 2001) and United
Kingdom (Pain, 2003). Expected credit losses are therefore understated during upswings and overstated
during downturns. A time-lag can notably be stressed between riskier loans which are granted during the
peak of the business cycle (Keeton, 1999; Jiménez and Saurina, 2005) and loan loss provisions which are
built up only during the next downturn according to backward-looking rules. This pattern is a major factor
in driving the cyclical nature of recorded bank prots and bank capital. In particular, Jordan et al. (2002)
emphasize that the cyclicality of loan loss provisions is reected in bank capital. As a result, provisioning
rules in a backward-looking system can be seen as contributing to the overall cyclicality of the nancial
system and the macro-economy more generally (Borio et al., 2001).
Although the recent debate about whether current practices of provisioning are biased towards procyclical
bank behavior, there is no study to our knowledge which explicitly examines the impact of loan loss provisions
on bank lending. Shrieves and Dahl (2002) - analyzing the utilization of the discretionary accounting practice
of the Japanese banks during 1989-1996 - nd a negative and signicant relationship between loan loss
provisions and year-on-year change in total loans. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that loan
loss provisions inuence credit cycles. However, to test explicitly the impact of loan loss provisions on the
uctuations of bank lending, the discretionary component and the non discretionary component need to be
distinguished. Indeed, the cyclical behavior of non discretionary provisions should reinforce the cyclical nature
of bank lending. On the contrary, the discretionary component, through the income smoothing behavior,
may reduce the procyclicality of bank lending.
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3 Estimation of the discretionary and non discretionary compo-
nents of loan loss provisions
To test the impact of loan loss provisions (LLP) on uctuations in bank lending, we need to estimate
the discretionary and the non discretionary components of LLP. We use a methodology similar to the one
developed by Ahmed et al. (1999).
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics
We use a sample consisting of an unbalanced panel of annual report data from 1992 to 2004 for a set of
European banks in 15 European countries7 : Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (see Appendix,
Table A1). The bank data used for the estimates come from Bankscope Fitch IBCA8 . A majority of banks do
not give information on some variables needed by this study (especially non performing loans and total capital
ratio). Also we delete banks with less than ve years of time series observations. Moreover, we exclude all
the outliers by eliminating the extreme bank/year observations (2.5% lowest values and 2.5% highest values)
for each considered variable9 . The nal sample consists of 186 European banks out of the 2 513 available
at the beginning (see Table A1 in the appendix for details). However, our unbalanced sample represents a
signicant part of total loans available in Bankscope Fitch IBCA. The average cover rates of total loans are
around 37% in 1992 and 54% in 2004 (see Appendix, Table A1).
Descriptive statistics of our sample are presented in Table 1. Deposits are the main resource (65.67%)
and loans are the main banksassets (58.53%). These assets seem carefully managed as mean ratios of LLP
to total assets and nonperforming loans to gross loans are respectively 0.41% and 5.08%. Furthermore, the
total capital ratio is 12.43%. Thus, on average, banks are well capitalized with su¢ cient capital bu¤ers.
7The European banking system can be considered as unied since the Second European Banking Directive of 1989. Thus,
we consider a sample of European banks without taking into account countries of origination.
8All the banks in our sample publish their annual nancial statements at the end of the calendar year.
9The outliers represent around 5% of the banks excluded of our sample (approximately 125 banks). Thus most of the banks
were thrown out because we miss data about some variables.
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3.2 Modelling bank provisions
Empirical evidence and economic theory (Beaver and Engel, 1996; Liu et al., 1997; Ahmed et al., 1999; Lobo
and Yang, 2001) suggest a number of factors which may explain the choice of LLP. These may be grouped
into three classes.
3.2.1 Non discretionary behaviors
The non discretionary component of LLP reects expected losses but backward-looking rules based on iden-
tied credit loses give a strong cyclicality to this component. The model includes three variables which
represent the risk of a banks portfolio. The ratio of non performing loans to gross loans at the end of the
year t (NPLit) and the rst di¤erence of NPLit (t+1=tNPLit = NPLit+1   NPLit) are good indicators
of the risk of default on banksloans. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between these two variables
and LLP. We also include the risk of default for the overall credit portfolio, measured by the ratio of loans
to total asset (Lit). The coe¢ cient associated with this variable should also be positive.
3.2.2 Discretionary behaviors
The discretionary component of LLP results from three di¤erent management objectives.
The income smoothing behavior:
Under the income smoothing hypothesis, banks understate (overstate) LLP when earnings are expected
to be low (high) relative to that of other years (inter-temporal smoothing). If banks use LLP to smooth
earnings, then we would expect a positive relation between earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions
(ERit) and LLP. As the propensity to smooth income is higher for banks with good performance relative to
banks with moderate current performance, we introduce a dummy variable which takes the value of ERit for
banks with positive earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions and 0 otherwise (ER_Hit). We should
nd a positive coe¢ cient for ER_Hit if there is non linearity in the relation between LLP and earnings.
The capital management behavior:
Poorly capitalized banks can use LLP to manage regulatory capital. We compute the variable TCRLit
which takes the value of the total capital ratio (TCR) minus 8 and divided by 8 when observations for
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bank i are in the rst quartile of TCR and 0 otherwise. A positive correlation between LLP and TCRLit
could be expected if poorly capitalized banks are less willing to make LLP (Shrieves and Dahl, 2002).
However, accounting relations could also inuence the relation between bank capital and loan loss provisions.
Regulatory capital is composed of Tier 1 - which includes equity and retained earnings - and Tier 2 - which
includes subordinated debt and loan loss allowances (depending on general provisions). LLP are therefore
positively correlated to Tier 2 and negatively to Tier 1. If regulatory capital variations are more related to
retained earnings than loan loss allowances, correlation should be negative between LLP and TCRLit10 .
The signalling behavior:
Banks can use LLP to signal nancial strength. The variable SIGNit, dened as the one-year-ahead
changes of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (SIGNit = (ERit+1 ERit)=0:5(TAt+TAt+1);where
TA is the total asset), is computed to test the signalling hypothesis. A positive correlation with LLP is
expected (Beaver et al., 1989; Whalen, 1994; Ahmed et al., 1999).
3.2.3 Macroeconomic inuences on asset quality
The macroeconomic environment should a¤ect the ability of borrowers to repay banksassets. The private
sector wealth will vary with the economic cycle, so we introduce the annual growth rate of GDP, _yit. Some
studies have empirically studied the economic cycle as a determinant of loan loss provisions (see Pain (2003)
for UK banks, Fernandez de Lis et al. (2001) for the Spanish case, Cavallo and Majnoni (2001), Laeven
and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005)). They nd a signicant and negative impact on
provisions: loan losses increase (and hence LLP) when _yit decreases. Thus, we expected a negative sign for
the variable _yit.
10We use in our study the total capital ratio (TCR = TIER1+TIER2) because a majority of banks do not give specic
information on their level of TIER 1 and TIER 2.
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3.2.4 Model specication
Equation (1) models the relationship between loan loss provisions and the explanatory variables dened
above:
LLPit = 0 + 1
(+)
LLPit 1 + 2
(+)
NPLit + 3
(+)
t=t+1NPLit + 4
(+)
Lit + 5
( )
_yit (1)
+6
(+)
ERit + 7
(+)
ER_Hit + 8
(+)
TCRLit + 9
(+)
SIGNit + "it;
where LLPit is the ratio of loan loss provisions (specic provisions plus general provisions) to total assets at
the end of the year t for bank i. We introduce the lagged dependent variable as explanatory variable to take
into account a dynamic adjustment of LLPit. If banks adjust their provisions slowly to recognize potential
losses against loans following a default event, then provisions could be systematically related each period.
The model accounts for the possibility that the use of discretionary LLP for one purpose is conditional on
the e¤ects of the other two motivations; this is done by jointly estimating the relationships between loan loss
provisions and income smoothing, capital management and signalling behaviors.
The estimation of equation (1) is used to compute the non discretionary component (NDISCit) and the
discretionary component (DISCit) of the LLP. We assume that these two components are linear functions
of the variables included in equation (1). Thus, the non discretionary component of LLP is estimated as the
sum of the products of its explanatory variable times the corresponding estimated coe¢ cient from equation
(1). The same method is used to compute the discretionary component.
3.3 Empirical results
As we consider a dynamic adjustment of LLP, the estimation of equation (1) is performed with the general-
ized method of moments (GMM) using rst di¤erences (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and orthogonal deviations
(Arellano and Bover, 1995). The results are reported in Table 2. This estimation is robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation. We also ensure that the correlations between exogenous variables are weak.
The coe¢ cients on NPLit (2) and on t=t+1NPLit (3) are signicantly positive at the 1% level. This
result implies that the cyclical evolution of non performing loans inuences provisioning via the backward-
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looking rules. Bank prots are therefore also inuenced by the cyclicality of identied credit losses via loan
loss provisions. The other variable introduced to assess the e¤ect of expected credit losses on LLP choices,
the ratio of loans to total asset Lit, is not signicant at the 10% level (the t-stat is 1.30). The signicant
and negative coe¢ cient for GDP growth (5) indicates that the macroeconomic situation is relevant which
strengthen the cyclical behavior of LLP. Business cycle inuences nancial strength of rms and households
and therefore has a close relationship with problem loans. This implies not only an increase in specic
provisions according to backward-looking rules but also an increase in the general provisions as the GDP
growth modies the credit exposure of banks.
Concerning the discretionary behaviors, our results show that poorly capitalized banks use LLP to manage
regulatory capital. Poorly capitalized banksprovisions vary directly with their surplus regulatory capital
(8>0). Thus, banks with low capital are less inclined in making LLP since it reduces Tier 1 via its impact
on earnings. The estimated coe¢ cient of the variable earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (6) is
signicant and negative. This is not consistent with the hypothesis of an income smoothing behavior. On
the contrary, banks reduce loan loss provisions when earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions increase.
This result emphasizes the cyclicality in loan loss provisions already underscored by the non discretionary
component since high earnings are recorded during economic upswings. However, there is non linearity in
the relation between LLP and earnings. The variable ER_Hit, accounting for banks with a relatively good
performance, exhibits a positive and signicant coe¢ cient (7). Wald tests shows that the total impact
(6 + 7) of earnings on loan loss provisions is negative and signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 5% level
for banks with a relatively good performance. Therefore, these banks are more able to o¤set the cyclicality
of loan loss provisions. With regard to the signalling behavior, banks may use discretionary LLP to signal
nancial strength when the stock market underestimates their earnings. We nd that the coe¢ cient on
SIGNit (9) is positive and signicant, which is consistent with the signalling hypothesis.
We use the estimates of equation (1) to compute the non discretionary (NDISC) and the discretionary
(DISC) components of LLP. It is assumed that these two components are linear functions of the di¤erent
variables included in equation (1). Thus, they are estimated as the sum of the products of its explanatory
variables times the corresponding estimated coe¢ cients from equation (1). To check for robustness, we com-
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pute di¤erent non discretionary and discretionary variables. The following three non discretionary variables
are computed for each of two methods of estimation (Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover
(1995))
NDISC1it = 1LLPit 1 + 2NPLit + 3t=t+1NPLit + 4Lit + 5 _yit; (2)
NDISC2it = 1LLPit 1 + 2NPLit + 3t=t+1NPLit + 5 _yit; (3)
NDISC2it = 2NPLit + 3t=t+1NPLit + 5 _yit: (4)
The variable NDISC1it includes all the variables which may explain NDISC whereas NDISC2it only in-
cludes the signicant variables at the 10% level, which implies that the variable Lit is excluded. The third
non discretionary variable (NDISC3it) excludes the lagged dependent variable LLPit 1 and the variable Lit
which is not signicant at the 10% level. On the same way, two discretionary components are computed
DISC1it = 6ERit + 7ER_Hit + 8TCRLit + 9SIGNit (5)
DISC2it = 7ER_Hit + 9SIGNit: (6)
We consider the set of explanatory variables that are signicant to compute the rst discretionary variable,
DISC1it. For the second one, we only keep the variables that may have a countercyclical e¤ect: ER_Hit
and SIGNit. The income smoothing and signalling behaviors may o¤set the evolution of non discretionary
provisions, increasing loan loss reserves in good times. This could positively a¤ect banksability to supply
credits, whereas the capital management may have no clear impact on the cyclicality of bank lending.
These discretionary and non discretionary variables are used to test the impact of provisioning behaviors
on bank loans uctuations.
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4 Credit uctuations and provisioning practices
4.1 Specication of credit uctuations
An empirical model on bank lending uctuations is used to investigate macroeconomic implications of banks
procyclicality behavior. Most theoretical models on bank lending uctuations are drawn on Bernanke and
Blinder (1988) which originally introduced the credit market equilibrium in a textbook IS-LM model. How-
ever, empirical investigation with panel data calls several digressions. The empirical model has to t micro-
economic data and explain credit uctuations at the bank level. We use a methodology similar to Kashyap
and Stein (1995) who originally proposed a reduced form dynamic equation for bank loans. The model we
estimate is written as
t 1=tLit = 0 + 1t 2=t 1Lit 1 + 2t 1=tDit + 3 _yit + 4iit + 5it + 6TCRLit (7)
+7NDISCit + 8NDISCit Dum+ 9DISCit + uit;
where t 1=tLit = (Lit   Lit 1)=0:5(TAit + TAit 1); TAit is the total asset; t 1=tDit is the growth rate
of deposits between year (t   1) and t; _yit is the GDP growth rate between the year (t   1) and t; iit is
the money market rate; it is the ination rate; TCRLit equals (total capital ratio-8)/8 when observations
for bank i are in the rst quartile of the total capital ratio (TCR) and 0 otherwise; NDISCit equals to
NDISC1it, NDISC2it or NDISC3it; DISCit equals to DISC1it or DISC2it; NDISCit  Dum equals
to the non discretionary variable (NDISC1it, NDISC2it or NDISC3it) multiplied by a dummy variable
which takes the value of 1 if the bank i is classied as poorly capitalized (TCRLit) and 0 otherwise.
Three groups of variables are considered in the model. Firstly, three macroeconomic variables are intro-
duced. By including ination and GDP growth rate, the model accounts for the economic environment. We
should nd a positive sign for the GDP growth rate (3>0) since this variable is related to loan demand.
The annual ination rate should have a negative sign (5<0). The sign of the coe¢ cient associated with the
money market rate should be negative (4<0) according to the e¤ect of a contractionary monetary policy on
bank lending.
Secondly, we consider bank specic variables. We expect a positive relationship between bank loans
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uctuations and the growth rate of deposits between year (t   1) and t (2>0). Furthermore, one variable
is computed to take into account the bank capital channel, TCRLit. We should nd a positive sign for
the coe¢ cient associated to TCRLit (6>0) since the regulatory capital requirement should represent a
constraint for poorly capitalized banks.
Finally, three variables are introduced to analyze the relationship between loan loss provisions and credit
supply uctuations. First, the non discretionary component of LLP (NDISCit) takes up reserves that the
bank have to charge to o¤set its problem loans. This component of loan loss provisions is therefore expected to
reduce banks incentive to expand its credit supply (7<0) as it directly a¤ects prots. During a downturn,
the overall return on lending is particularly a¤ected by the upsurge in loan loss provision resulting from
backward looking rules. We expect a negative coe¢ cient whatever the non discretionary variable considered:
NDISC1it, NDISC2it or NDISC3it. Second, we introduce an interaction variable NDISCit Dum (Dum
is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the bank i is classied as poorly capitalized) to test if
there is non-linearity in the relation between non discretionary provisions and credit uctuations. Indeed the
e¤ect of non discretionary provisions on credit uctuations could be stronger for poorly capitalized banks
(8<0) since these banks cannot use a capital bu¤er to face an upsurge in loan losses. Third, we consider
two discretionary variables: DISC1it or DISC2it. The second one takes only into account discretionary
behaviors that may have a counterbalancing e¤ect on the cyclical evolution of non discretionary provisions
and could therefore be considered as a kind of unregulated dynamic provisioning (Bikker and Metzemakers,
2005): the income smoothing and the signalling. These discretionary behaviors reduce the volatility of bank
prots, increasing provisions during the expansionary phase and decreasing provisions during the recession
phase. As a result, prots as well as provisions are smoothed, which should positively a¤ect banks ability
to supply credits. We therefore expect a positive relationship between the discretionary variable DISC2it
and credit uctuations in equation (7) (9>0). The discretionary variable DISC1it accounts for di¤erent
behaviors. As the capital management behavior may have no clear e¤ect on the cyclicality of bank lending
and as the variable ERit does not have the expected sign, the sign of the coe¢ cient associated with the
discretionary variable DISC1it is unknown.
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4.2 Results
The estimation of equation (7) is performed with the generalized method of moments (GMM). This method is
relevant because the provisioning constraints (variables NDISCit and DISCit) are built using the coe¢ cients
from the regression of equation (1) and therefore contains measurement error. In addition, the lag of the
endogenous variable can lead to a simultaneity bias. These variables are therefore instrumented. Tables
2 and 3 report estimates obtained using respectively the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991) and by Arellano and Bover (1995). As we have three di¤erent non discretionary variables (NDISC1it,
NDISC2it and NDISC3it) and two di¤erent discretionary variables (DISC1it and DISC2it), Tables 2 and
3 display results for six estimations.
As expected, macroeconomic variables are relevant in credit uctuations in all estimates. The coe¢ cient
of the GDP growth rate (3) is signicant and positive whereas the coe¢ cient of the ination rate (5) is
negative and signicant. The coe¢ cient of the money market interest rate (4) is signicant and negative.
It means that monetary policy a¤ects bank lending. We also nd that banks use deposits to expand credit
as the coe¢ cient 2 is positive and signicant.
With regard to the institutional constraints, we nd that the coe¢ cient associated with the regulatory
capital requirement for poorly capitalized banks (6) is positive and signicant at the 1% level, which is
consistent with the bank capital channel. These banks are therefore constrained in their lending activities.
The provisioning rules also appear relevant in all estimates. Non discretionary loan loss provisions (7)
a¤ect credit uctuations negatively and signicantly at the 1% level. Backward-looking provisioning rules
therefore amplify credit cycle: weak specic provisions during upswing phases encourage banks to expand
credit whereas the sudden identication of problem loans during downturns constrains banks to make pro-
visions, which reduces their incentive to supply new credits. As expected, poorly capitalized banks appear
more constrained by the provisioning system. Indeed, the coe¢ cient associated by the interacting term
NDISCit Dum is negative and signicant, except two estimates in Table 4. Jordan et al. (2002) emphasize
that the cyclicality of loan loss provisions is reected in bank capital. Indeed, bank capital can also be used to
face expected credit losses following a sudden quality deterioration of the loan portfolio. Capital requirements
force poorly capitalized banks to shrink further lending.
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On the contrary, discretionary provisions associated with the income smoothing and signalling behaviors
and acting like dynamic provisions (DISC2it), do not a¤ect credit uctuations at the 10% level in most
estimates. Likewise, we do not nd a robust relation between the discretionary variable DISC1it and credit
uctuations. Thus, discretionary accounting practices do not seem to perform as an unregulated dynamic
provision system which could e¢ ciently counterbalance cyclical behavior of non discretionary provisions. The
ndings of our research are thus consistent with the call for the implementation of a dynamic provisioning in
Europe to eliminate the e¤ect of backward-looking provisioning practices on credit uctuations.
5 Credit cycle and dynamic provisioning
The model estimated in this paper concerns bank lending uctuations. Long term and short term factors
cannot be properly isolated (as in Figure 1) since panel data with a short time period are used. However,
the accounting constraint  linked to the evolution of non discretionary provisions  is relevant for short
term uctuations. This factor is driven by the cyclicality of identied credit losses as long as banks and
regulators will not implement a proper recognition of expected credit losses. Several other banksbehaviors
for example, bias toward optimism, herd behavior or disaster myopia are more frequently highlighted to
explain the credit cycle. The supervision of these behaviors is di¢ cult to implement and the importance of
such behaviors tends to increase. The competition in the banking sector is strong and regulators promote
internal risk management approaches, which is notably favourable for herd behavior and disaster myopia.
Conversely, the implementation of a forward-looking provisioning system could more easily reduce the credit
cycle since bank regulators can adopt this system unilaterally.
A forward-looking provisioning system could break or more precisely o¤set the correlation between non
discretionary provisions and credit uctuations. This system consists of implementing statistical provisions
linking loan loss provisions with long term expected losses and not with contemporaneous problem loans.
Statistical provisions are computed as the di¤erence between expected losses and specic provisions, i.e. they
can either be positive or negative. Banks therefore have to estimate precisely their expected losses using their
own internal models or a standard approach developed by the regulator (Fernandez de Lis et al, 2001). As
a result, banks build up statistical provisions during upswing phases when actual losses and consequently
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specic provisions are weak compared to total loans and draw down these reserves during downturns.
For the full business cycle, loan loss provisions are therefore smoothed.
Previous researches (Fernandez de Lis et al, 2001; Borio et al., 2001; Mann and Michael, 2002; Jiménez
and Saurina, 2005) emphasize the e¤ect of dynamic provisioning to smooth bank income and to stabilize
bank capital. The improvement in the evaluations of both credit risks and bank prots explain these positive
outcomes. Furthermore, our ndings show that provisioning also inuences credit uctuations. Our estima-
tions can be used to graphically illustrate the relevance of backward-looking provisioning practices to amplify
credit uctuations. Figure 2 illustrates the contributions of deposits, non discretionary provisions and GDP
to changes in credit uctuations. We represent the average situation which means that Figure 2 has to be
cautiously analyzed. Credit uctuations (t 1=tLit) are consistently positive from 1994 to 2003. They are
particularly strong in 1999 and 2000, respectively at 9.20 and 9.78. Figure 2 shows that changes in credit
uctuations record numerous swings, which is consistent with the occurrence of a credit cycle. The weakest
credit uctuation was recorded in 1994 (3.85) and peaked in 2000, followed by a slowdown. Changes in credit
uctuations are broken down into several variables according to equation (7). Deposits are the main factor
explaining variations in credit uctuations. In particular, they have strong and positive contributions in 1995
and 1999 and negative ones in 1996 and 1998. Non discretionary provisions also contribute signicantly to
explain changes in credit uctuations. They also appear as important as the e¤ect of variations in the GDP
growth rate. The reduction in non discretionary provisions  i.e. in identied credit losses  is signicant
for the credit expansion specically in 1995, 1999 and 2000. Their importance was limited during the slow-
down of credit uctuations from 2001. Indeed, banks weathered the slowdown particularly well; identied
credit losses had been limited on average. The decline in GDP growth rate was more relevant to explain
this slowdown in credit uctuations but we can also point that non discretionary provisions have been more
restrictive for poorly capitalized banks according to the e¤ect emphasized by the variable NDISCit Dum in
our estimates. Finally, we point out that credit uctuations related to non discretionary provisions displayed
on Figure 2 result directly from an unsatisfactory backward-looking provisioning system. This factor is not
the main source of uctuations, but it could be easily removed from the credit cycle.
Our research gets to the heart of the di¤erences in opinion between nancial supervisors and account-
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ing authorities. Over recent years, di¤erent approaches have been proposed to change both national and
international accounting standards11 in order to include more forward-looking practices. The Full Fair Value
Accounting (FFVA) suggests that all nancial instruments including loans should be measured at market
value. As a result, gains and losses should be recognized in the prot and loss account as soon as they are ex-
pected. A dynamic provisioning system represents the main alternative to take into account more cautiously
expected losses. Given the cyclicality of bank lending, our result support a dynamic provisioning system
as it provides a more satisfactory institutional arrangement. Indeed, FFVA is not appropriate to support
nancial stability. It can enhance the procyclical character of bank lending because immediate recognition
of unrealized value might reinforce the e¤ects of shocks (Enria, 2004). It also increases banksearnings and
regulatory capital volatilities (Barth et al., 1995) which can impact the volatility of banksbalance sheets.
Moreover, FFVA could a¤ect the liquidity transformation role of banks and could reduce their contribution to
inter-temporal smoothing (Freixas and Tsomocos, 2004). Furthermore, FFVA does not adequately recognize
the specic nature of bank lending. It views banks as portfolio managers rather than as institutions that
solve informational problems12 . As a result, the banking industry and banking supervisor are opposed to
FFVA (Chisnall, 2000).
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to determine if the current provisioning system in Europe amplies credit
uctuations. Using a panel of 186 European banks for the period 1992-2004, we empirically investigated the
e¤ect of LLP on bank lending uctuations. In the rst step, we analyzed whether the choice of LLP reects
identied credit losses (non discretionary LLP) and/or management objectives (discretionary LLP). Then,
in the second step, we examined the variables which have an e¤ect on bank credit uctuations.
Our results show that macroeconomic variables are relevant to explain credit uctuations. We also nd
that poorly capitalized banks are constrained in their lending activities. With regards to the provisioning
rules, the results show that the non discretionary component of LLP amplies the credit cycle. During an
11For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Borio et al. (2001).
12This is because the market value of banksloan is di¢ cult to dene due to the underlying special information which is only
available for banks (Berger et al., 1991).
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upswing, banks tend to underestimated expected credit risk and then reduce non discretionnary LLP. Banks
incentives to grant new loans are therefore reinforced since lending costs are understated. Conversely, sudden
identication of problem loans during a downturn constrains banks to make non discretionary provisions,
which reduces their incentive to supply new credits. In addition, this e¤ect is stronger for poorly capitalized
banks since these banks cannot use a capital bu¤er to face an upsurge in loan losses. On the contrary, the
discretionary component of LLP does not a¤ect credit uctuations.
Our ndings are consistent with the call for the implementation of a forward-looking principle in Europe
through a dynamic provisioning system as in Spain and Portugal. Such dynamic provisioning system will
require a recalibration of the Basel Accord. A fourth pillar perhaps to be called the accounting pillar 
could therefore be included in the Basel Accord especially to cope with expected credit losses. Moreover, the
bank regulatory capital which incorporates general provisions up to a ceiling would also need to be changed
in order to solely cover unexpected losses.
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Table 1: Statistics on the business and credit cycles from 1980 to 2005
Germany France Italy UK
GDP Credit GDP Credit GDP Credit GDP Credit
Mean on absolute values 0.718 0.994 0.486 1.275 0.513 1.421 0.715 3.667
Standard error 0.888 1.207 0.617 1.538 0.660 1.685 0.883 4.540
Autocorrelation 0.889 0.927 0.896 0.917 0.869 0.908 0.900 0.954
Correlation 0.344 0.461 0.004 0.319
GDP does not Granger
cause Credit (p-value)
0.107 0.000 0.005 0.000
Credit does not Granger
cause GDP (p-value)
0.066 0.000 0.002 0.000
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Table 2: Non discretionary ans discretionary components of LLP
2.1
(Arellano-Bond)
2.2
(Arellano-Bover)
LLPit( 1)
(+)
0.2624a
(7.35)
0.2723a
(8.09)
NPLit
(+)
0.0261a
(2.65)
0.0248a
(2.94)
t=t+1NPLit
(+)
0.0009b
(2.12)
0.0011a
(2.75)
Lit
(+)
0.0029
(1.30)
0.0026
(1.31)
_yit
(-)
-0.0113a
(-2.53)
-0.0120a
(-2.88)
ERit
(+)
-0.3522a
(-11.78)
-0.3541a
(-12.73)
ER_Hit
(+)
0.2271a
(7.42)
0.2204a
(7.53)
TCRLit
(+)
0.4148a
(2.81)
0.4190a
(2.95)
SIGNit
(+)
2.9986c
(1.83)
3.3505b
(2.25)
J-stat 45.16 43.23
Obs. 739 739
Note: a, b and c indicate signicance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for
heteroskedasticity following Whites methodology.
Variable denitions: LLPit: ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets at the end of the year t; NPLit: ratio
of non performing loans to gross loans at the end of the year t; t=t+1NPLit: NPL growth rate between year t
and (t+1); Lit: ratio of loans to total assets at the end of the year t; _yit: GDP growth rate between the year (t-1)
and t; ERit: ratio of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to total asset; ER_Hit: take the value of ERit
for banks with positive earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions and 0 otherwise; TCRLit: (TCRit-8)/8 when
observations for bank i are in the rst quartile of the total capital ratio (TCR) and 0 otherwise; SIGNit: take the
value of the one-year-ahead change of ERit.
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Table 3: Bank loan uctuations (Arellano Bond (1991) estimator)
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6)
t 1=tLit( 1)
(+)
0.0298a
(8.13)
0.0200a
(4.07)
0.0143a
(3.05)
0.0613a
(11.42)
0.0320a
(10.55)
0.0552a
(17.76)
t 1=tDit
(+)
0.2276a
(59.31)
0.2414a
(45.16)
0.2329a
(33.25)
0.2590a
(58.08)
0.2705a
(85.06)
0.2691a
(96.96)
_yit
(+)
0.9571a
(24.37)
0.9571a
(24.37)
0.8187a
(8.94)
0.9425a
(29.16)
0.9661a
(61.29)
0.7383a
(46.70)
iit
(-)
-0.4507a
(-12.00)
-0.4681a
(-14.73)
-0.2870a
(-3.84)
-0.4714a
(-18.01)
-0.3033a
(-11.82)
-0.2584a
(-11.83)
it
(-)
-0.2218a
(-8.68)
-0.3064a
(-7.69)
-0.5293a
(-6.83)
-0.5612a
(-10.54)
-0.5994a
(-21.94)
-0.8772a
(-43.91)
TCRLit
(+)
0.2384a
(21.94)
0.2077a
(24.58)
0.2035a
(12.50)
0.2330a
(12.95)
0.1679a
(14.81)
0.2424a
(19.29)
NDISC1it
(-)
-0.0401a
(-12.42)
- -
-0.0353a
(-10.29)
- -
NDISC2it
(-)
-
-0.0672a
(-21.25)
- -
-0.0777a
(-24.90)
-
NDISC3it
(-)
- -
-0.1852a
(-8.97)
- -
-0.1319a
(-20.96)
NDISCit Dum
(-)
-0.0369a
(-3.94)
-0.0583a
(-5.84)
-0.0896a
(-6.03)
-0.0750a
(-8.42)
-0.1098a
(-11.48)
-0.1915a
(-7.92)
DISC1it
(?)
-0.0039b
(-2.28)
-0.0013
(-0.69)
-0.0006
(-0.19)
- - -
DISC2it
(-)
- - -
-0.0086
(-1.13)
-0.0201a
(-3.99)
0.0045
(1.04)
J  stat 97.35 98.21 93.68 100.46 101.39 98.03
Obs. 556 556 556 556 556 556
Note: a, b and c indicate signicance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for
heteroskedasticity following Whites methodology.
Variable denitions: t 1=tLit: loansvariation of bank i between years (t-1) and t / 0.5*(total assets of year
(t-1) + total assets of year t); t 1=tDit: growth rate of deposits between year (t-1) and t; _yit: GDP growth rate
between the year (t-1) and t; iit: money market rate; it: ination rate; TCRLit: (TCRit-8)/8 when observations
for bank i are in the rst quartile of the total capital ratio (TCR) and 0 otherwise; NDISC1it, NDISC2it and
NDISC3it: the three specications of the non discretionary component of LLP ; NDISCit*DumTCRLit: the non
discretionary component of LLP when observations for bank i are in the rst quartile of the total capital ratio
(TCR) and 0 otherwise; DISC1it and DISC2it: the two specications of the discretionary component of LLP .
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Table 4: Bank loan uctuations (Arellano Bover (1995) estimator)
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6)
t 1=tLit( 1)
(+)
0.0268a
(8.40)
0.0159a
(9.72)
0.0164
(5.48)
0.0440a
(21.36)
0.0430a
(9.98)
0.0374a
(16.64)
t 1=tDit
(+)
0.2270a
(71.34)
0.2363a
(132.62)
0.2339a
(48.78)
0.2517a
(55.87)
0.2716a
(130.51)
0.2451a
(117.93)
_yit
(+)
0.9673a
(28.06)
0.9644a
(59.42)
0.8134a
(36.14)
0.8865a
(50.23)
0.9329a
(28.61)
0.7198a
(38.60)
iit
(-)
-0.5383a
(-20.89)
-0.5050a
(-31.32)
-0.4479a
(-17.11)
-0.4955a
(-27.64)
-0.5414a
(-6.95)
-0.3223a
(-15.02)
it
(-)
-0.3903a
(-11.44)
-0.4525a
(-24.77)
-0.6583a
(-14.00)
-0.3830a
(-13.26)
-0.6597a
(-15.37)
-0.8425a
(-62.55)
TCRLit
(+)
0.1985a
(29.12)
0.1874a
(55.97)
0.1342a
(13.78)
0.2040a
(16.17)
0.2399a
(19.74)
0.1635a
(19.82)
NDISC1it
(-)
-0.0488a
(-8.14)
- -
-0.0526a
(-15.40)
- -
NDISC2it
(-)
-
-0.0683a
(-26.13)
- -
-0.0581a
(-10.02)
-
NDISC3it
(-)
- -
-0.1484a
(-15.04)
- -
-0.1518a
(-14.41)
NDISCit Dum
(-)
-0.0250a
(-8.04)
-0.0520a
(-27.36)
-0.0076
(-0.64)
-0.0154a
(-2.58)
-0.0619a
(-5.38)
0.0158
(1.27)
DISC1it
(?)
-0.0104a
(-4.71)
-0.0056a
(-4.16)
-0.0079b
(-2.28)
- - -
DISC2it
(-)
- - -
0.0189a
(6.47)
0.0088
(0.81)
-0.0014
(-0.39)
J  stat 98.02 98.50 101.40 98.94 93.56 106.35
Obs. 556 556 556 556 556 556
Note: a, b and c indicate signicance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for
heteroskedasticity following Whites methodology.
Variable denitions: t 1=tLit: loansvariation of bank i between years (t-1) and t / 0.5*(total assets of year
(t-1) + total assets of year t); t 1=tDit: growth rate of deposits between year (t-1) and t; _yit: GDP growth rate
between the year (t-1) and t; iit: money market rate; it: ination rate; TCRLit: (TCRit-8)/8 when observations
for bank i are in the rst quartile of the total capital ratio (TCR) and 0 otherwise; NDISC1it, NDISC2it and
NDISC3it: the three specications of the non discretionary component of LLP ; NDISCit*DumTCRLit: the non
discretionary component of LLP when observations for bank i are in the rst quartile of the total capital ratio
(TCR) and 0 otherwise; DISC1it and DISC2it: the two specications of the discretionary component of LLP .
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Figure 1: Business and credit cycles from 1980 to 2005
Note: Gaps are computed with EViews 5.1. We use the Christiano-Fitzgerald full sample asymmetric band-pass
lter. The low value for the cycle period to be ltered is 6 quarters and the high value is 36 quarters. Data source:
International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics (IFS).
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Figure 2: Contributions of deposits, GDP and non discretionary provisions to changes in credit uctuations
Note: This Figure uses average values of the variables and estimated coe¢ cients of equation (7). Credit
uctuations correspond to the endogenous variable (t 1=tLit). Changes in credit uctuations are dened by:
(t 1=tLit t 2=t 1Lit 1)/t 2=t 1Lit 1. NDISC, Deposits and GDP respectively represent the contribution
of non discretionary provisions, deposits and GDP to changes in credit uctuations, computed as follow:
t 1=tLit t 2=t 1Lit 1
t 2=t 1Lit 1
=
t 1=tDit t 2=t 1Dit 1
t 2=t 1Dit 1
1t 2=t 1Dit 1t 2=t 1Lit 1 +
_yit  _yit 1
_yit 1
 3 _yit 1t 2=t 1Lit 1
+NDISCit NDISCit 1NDISCit 1 
7NDISCit 1
t 2=t 1Lit 1
+uit
where uit is the change in credit uctuation explain by the other variables taken into account in equation (7).
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for European commercial and cooperative banks,
on average over the period 1992-2004.
L L D E NPL LLP TCR ROA
Mean 58:53 6:51 65:67 7:22 5:08 0:41 12:43 0:61
Max 97:89 48:02 92:32 75:84 29:02 3:76 39:32 3:09
Min 11:63  25:77 12:10 1:55 0:00  0:35 6:01  6:09
Std 16:25 7:75 14:56 4:43 4:37 0:36 4:26 0:54
Variable denitions: all variables are in percentage. L: loans/total assets; L: loansvariation of bank i between
years (t-1) and t / 0.5*(total assets of year (t-1) + total assets of year t); D: deposits/total assets; E: equity/total
assets; NPL: non-performing loans/gross loans; LLP : loan loss provisions/total assets; TCR: total capital ratio;
ROA: return on asset.
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